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SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION and E A R L M. 
BAKER, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR, 
and 
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, in his brief, incorrectly states the nature 
of the case to be a review of the proceedings, decisions 
and orders of the Salt Lake County Board of Equaliza-
tion. This is an original action in certiorari to review the 
proceedings, decisions and order of the State Tax Com-
OaseNo. 
13826 
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mission of Utah wherein the Tax Commission, pursuant 
to a formal hearing, sustained the decision of the Salt 
Lake County Board of Equalization determining that 
certain properties located in Salt Lake County and owned 
by the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Lodge 
No. 85, were not entitled to an exemption from ad valorem 
property taxes for the year 1973. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Salt Ijake County, seeks affirmation of 
the decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah up-
holding the decision of the County Board of Equalization 
wherein said County B>oard found that the improved real 
property owned by the petitioner was not being used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes as the term is defined 
by Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, and Utah Code Annotated, Sections 59-
2-1, 59-2-30 and 59-2-31, and that the property of peti-
tioner was subject to property taxes for the calendar year 
1973. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner, B. P. 0. E. No. 85, is a fraternal organi-
zation and a corporation existing under and by virtue of 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization is a 
board of Salt Lake County Commissioners existing by 
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah. 
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Petitioner, B. P. O. E. No. 85, is the owner of certain 
improved property located at 139 East South Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, more commonly known as the Elks' 
Lodge. During the year 1973, petitioner filed an applica-
tion for exemption with the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization (T-4 through T-38). On the 2nd day of 
July, 1973, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
issued its written decision specifically finding and con-
cluding as follows: 
1. The appellant, Salt Lake Lodge No. 85, 
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the 
United States, is a Utah non-profit corporation 
incorporated in 1950. It is also a subordinate 
lodge of the National Order of Elks. 
2. The purposes and objects for which the 
corporation was formed are fraternal, charitable, 
patriotic, historical and educational. 
3. To further these purposes, the corpora-
tion is authorized to: purchase, acquire, hold 
or convey all such real and personal property 
as may be necessary to carry on or promote the 
purposes of the organization. 
4. Applicant's property consists of two 
buildings — a lodge building and an office build-
ing. The office building is not used for lodge pur-
poses, but is leased for $700 per month. The 
lodge building is used primarily by and for the 
membership and their families and contains a 
lounge and dining room facilities for the benefit 
of the members. 
5. The nature and extent of the activities 
on the property claimed to be exempt is also in-
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dicated by the supporting financial data of the 
lodge which was filed with the application. The 
activities indicated therein clearly demonstrate 
that the overall primary use of applicant's prop-
erty is to produce rental and other income and 
for the fraternal and social benefit of the lodge, 
its members and their families, and any charit-
able use is merely incidental to the primary use 
by the lodge, its members and their families. 
CONCLUSION: 
1. The real property and improvements 
owned by the applicant [is] not used exclusively 
for charitable purposes within the meaning of 
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah, and Sections 59-2-1, 59-2-30 
and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
Petitioner, B. P. 0. E.> No. 85, filed a notice of appeal 
with the Tax Commission of Utah, thereby appealing 
the decision of the Salt Lake County Board of Equaliza-
tion to tax the property owned by B. P. 0. E., No. 85 
(T-l-2). 
Thereafter, a formal hearing was held before the 
Tax Commission of Utah on the 2nd day of July, 1974 
(T-49). 
On the 26th day of August, 1974, the Tax Commis-
sion issued its written Findings of Pact and Conclusions 
of Law (T-51-53). rFhe pertinent portions of the Find-
ings and Conclusions of the Tax Commission are as fol-
lows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"4. The Elks' Lodge building in question is 
made up of five floors, plus a basement constitut-
ing six floors — the use of which includes a 
large variety of social functions, including din-
ner, dancing, liquor consumption, organization 
meetings, as well as some charitable functions, 
which take place in the Elks' Lodge building 
each year. 
5. The third floor of the Elks' Lodge building, 
known as the Goodwill Room, is operated ex-
clusively for charitable purposes and the distri-
bution of clothing to the needy. 
6. Proceeds from food sales, liquor and cigar 
consumption on the premises, after expenses, 
go into a general fund, to be in part used for the 
benefit of different charitable programs of ap-
pellants. 
7. In fiscal 1973, approximately $300,000.00 
gross revenue was received by appellant, $39,-
000.00 of which was received specifically for char-
itable purposes and $29,000.00 of which was 
actually expended for charitable purposes. 
8. Appellant performs patriotic, charitable and 
civic functions, which include an annual Christ-
mas party for the crippled and handicapped; 
Elks' Boys and Girls Club, scouts, youth schol-
arship programs, foreign exchange students pro-
grams, veterans remembrance programs — all 
of which renders a great service to the commun-
ity. 
9. The majority of charitable functions fulfilled 
by appellant are through cash donations of mem-
bers, plus a multitude of man-hours contributed 
outside of the premises in question. 
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10. Other than the Goodwill Room on the third 
floor of the building and other than some organi-
zation functions, most other charitable functions 
are held at locations and buildings other than 
the buildings here in question. 
11. The appellant participates in many other 
civic, patriotic and worthwhile activities, but 
such participation does not constitute the ex-
clusive charitable u*$e of the property. 
12. Appellant makes no contention that its 
property is used for religious purposes, but main-
tains that its charitable functions within and 
without the premises render appellant's prem-
ises tax exempt." 
From the foregoing factual determination made by 
the Tax Commission of Utah pursuant to its formal hear-
ing, the following Conclusions of Law were issued: 
"1 . Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah State 
Constitution, providing that lots with buildings 
thereon used exclusively for either religious wor-
ship or charitable purposes shall be exempt from 
taxation, (See, also, Utah Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 58-21-1 (1953)) is applicable to the case at 
hand. 
2. Appellant's case of Elks v. Groesbeck, 40 
Utah 8, is not SLpplicable to the present situa-
tion, since a substantial portion of appellant's 
area is used for membership, social and recrea-
tional or is unused for any purpose, and the 
above cited case held that members' activities 
were incidental to its charitable use and is, there-
fore, differentiated from the present situation. 
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3. Exemption from ad valorem property taxes 
in 'the State of Utah is based upon actual use of 
the property in question and not on the use of 
income derived from the operations thereon, or 
on participation in civic and patriotic functions. 
4. Appellant's property in question during the 
calendar year 1973 was not used exclusively for 
charitable or religious purposes. The decision of 
the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
should be, therefore, affirmed." 
Based upon its Findings and Conclusions, the Tax Com-
mission issued its decision affirming the decision of the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in\ ilk/ 2(>l;fi 
day of August, 1974 (T-55). 
Petitioner, in its brief, does not dispute or challenge 
the factual determinations made by the Tax Commission 
of Utah, but in effect, asserts that the legal conclusions 
of the Commission with respect to said facts are incor-
rect. Respondent, therefore, asserts that the <*:ii\ ope* 
ative facts pertinent to the disposition of this appeal ,ws<! 
before this Honorable Court are those finding <>f fact 
made by the Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ELKS' LODGE WAS NOT BEING USED 
EXCLUSIVELY FOR CHARITABLE PUR-
POSES TO QUALIFY IT FOR EXEMPTION 
FROM TAXATION UNDER AND BY VIR-
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TUE OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF UTAH, AND SECTION 58-2-1, 
UTAH CODE A N N O T A T E D , 1953, AS 
AMENDED. 
The sole question to be resolved in this case is 
whether the building and premises known as Elks' Lodge 
No. 85 have been used exclusively for charitable pur-
poses, as shown by the facts adduced in this case, under 
and by virtue of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitu-
tion of Utah and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
Respondent, Salt Lake County, emphatically con-
tends that Elks' Lodge No. 85 has not met the burden 
required of it to show that its property is exempt from 
taxation. And the decision of the Tax Commission of 
Utah should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution 
provides, in part, as follows: 
"All tangible property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under 
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value, to be ascertained as provided by 
law. The property of the state, counties, cities, 
towns, school districts, municipal corporations 
and public libraries, lots with the buildings there-
on used exclusively for either religious worship or 
charitable purples, * * * shall be exempt from 
taxation. * * *" 
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Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
"The property of the United States, of this state, 
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal 
corporations and public libraries, lots with the 
buildings thereon used exclusively for either re-
ligious worship or charitable purposes, * * * 
shall be exempt from taxation." 
The general rule of construction regarding property 
tax exemptions is that all property of whatever kind 
soever and by whomsoever owned is subject to taxation. 
An exemption must not be aided by judicial interpreta-
tion. The rule of strict construction applies. All doubts 
must be resolved against the exemption. See Praker v. 
Quinn, 64 P. 961, 23 Utah 332 (1901). 
This Court has generally recognized that the ex-
emptions from taxation granted to properties used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes are dependent upon the 
actual use of the premises. As was stated by this Court 
in Friendship Manor Corporation v. Tax Commission, 26 
Utah 2d 227, 487 P. 2d 1272 (1972). 
"It is the use to which it puts its real property, 
which is the determination of whether or not 
such property is exempt. If the charitable organi-
zation does not use its real property and build-
ing thereon exclusively for charitable purposes, 
such property is not exempt, notwithstanding 
the fact that the owner thereof is a charitable 
organization." (at page 234) (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
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The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization found that 
the activities conducted upon petitioner's premises "clear-
ly demonstrate that the overall primary use of applicant's 
property is to produce rental and other income and for 
the fraternal and social benefit of the lodge, its members 
and their families, and any charitable use is merely inci-
dental to the primary use by the lodge, its members and 
their families" Our Constitution, Article XIII, Section 
2, requires that the property be used exclusively for char-
itable purposes to be exempt. Incidental use for char-
itable purposes is not sufficient. See Article XIII, Sec-
tion 2, Constitution of Utah. The Tax Commission in 
affirming the decision of the County Board of Equaliza-
tion found that the majority of the charitable functions 
of the organization are held at locations and buildings 
other than the building here in question. And the use 
of the property includes a large variety of social func-
tions, including dinner, dancing, liquor consumption, and 
organization meetings. And that the proceeds from food 
sales, liquor and cigar consumption on the premises, after 
expenses, go into a general fund, to be in part used for 
the benefit of different charitable programs of appellant. 
However, the general fund is used by the lodge to pay 
all operating expenses of the lodge and it is only after 
all expenses are met that any such funds might be avail-
able for charity (See T-p. 109, 112 and 113). In short, 
any monies that might result from the fraternal and social 
activities and use of the lodge by the members and their 
guests would be available for charity only after the ex-
penses of operations are met. Charity then is a secondary 
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consideration of the overall activities conducted upon 
the premises in question. This Court's attention is di-
rected to the universal truth written by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Missouri in denying an exemp-
tion to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks 61 
years ago: 
Charity is not a promiscuous mixer. Here 
she modestly sitands outside or goes away and 
waits; waits until the plaintiff has finished us-
ing the spacious and comfortable rooms for the 
pleasures of its members; waits until the curtain 
has fallen upon the last scene of the vaudeville 
performance on the stage; until the dancers are 
tired and have gone home; until the billiard 
rooms have been deserted to the markers; until 
the plaintiff has paid the cost of its own enter-
tainment and goes out and finds her and hands 
her whaitever it may have left in its own pocket. 
She gets not the use of the premises but what 
remains of income to the owners after they have 
used it in carrying out the injunction of their 
organic law, by promoting their own welfare, en-
hancing their own happiness, and cultivating 
their own good fellowship among themselves. 
See St. Louis Lodge v. Koeln, 262 Mo. 444, 171 S. W. 
329 (1914). To extend the language of the Utah Con-
stitution to a point whereby petitioner's property is 
granted exemption would be contrary to the plain mean-
ing of the language creating religious and charitable ex-
emptions. 
In order to be entitled to an exemption, the prop-
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erty exempted must be used in such a manner that the 
state is relieved of a burden that it must otherwise as-
sume. As this Court stated in Friendship Manor, supra, 
at page 1277: 
"The power to tax rests upon necessity and is 
essential to the existence of the state, and in 
order to be exempt, the state must be benefited 
in some regard so as to relieve the state of some 
burden." 
Is the State of Utah required to provide a facility where-
by members of a fraternal order may meet and have 
dinner? I t the State of Utah required to provide a facil-
ity whereby members of a fraternal order may hold a 
dance? Is the State of Utah required to provide a facil-
ity whereby members of a fraternal order or their fami-
lies may consume liquor or hold meetings? The answer 
is no. As this Court stated again in Friendship Manor. 
"The state does not have the obligation to pro-
vide living accommodations to persons well, able 
and willing to pay for their needs." 
Certainly, in the instant case, there is no obligation upon 
the state to make such a facility available. To be entitled 
to exemption, the physical property under consideration 
must be used for charity and such exemption does not 
extend to the institution per se. See Odd Fellows' Build-
ing Ass'n v. Naylor, 177 P. 214, 53 Utah 111 (1918). This 
principal was perhaps most dearly discussed by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court in 1932: 
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"Applying these principles of law to the facts, 
it is obvious to us that, even assuming Arizona 
Lodge No. 2 is a 'charitable institution' within 
the constitutional provision, the Masonic Tem-
ple is not a 'charitable institution' within the 
terms of Section 3067, supra. It consists of three 
lodge rooms, an auditorium, banquet rooms, of-
fices for officials, lounge rooms, kitchen, and 
various storage rooms, appropriately furnished 
and prepared for use for which their names des-
ignate. None of the rooms is used in any man-
ner for the relief of the indigent or the afflicted. 
The only connection which the temple has with 
such relief is that the organization which owns 
it has that as one of its objects, and uses part 
of its funds derived from many sources, among 
which is the rental of certain portions of the 
temple, for that purpose." 
Conrad v. Maricopa County, 40 Arizona 390, 12 
P. 2d 613 (1932) at page 615. 
A distinction must, therefore, be made between those 
charitable lands used directly for the purpose of charity 
as opposed to those which provide income which is later 
put to eleemosynary purposes. The uses of petitioner's 
property in the instant case are as a parking area, for 
lodge activities, liquor and cigar sales and assumption, 
and otiher meetings and social and fraternal activities of 
the members. The third floor from the basement is used 
75% for storage and processing of clothing for indigents 
and 25% for storage of petitioner's property (T-88 & 89). 
The direct use of the property, therefore, is for the ac-
tivities of its members. To consider the property of 
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petitioner as being used exclusively for charitable pur-
poses as that term was intended by the framers of the 
Utah Constitution: 
". . . would amount to an absolute perversion 
of the plain meaning and intent of the framers 
of the constitution and the citizens of the state 
who afterwards voted for its adoption." 
Odd Fellows' Building Ass'n v. Naylor, 53 Utah 
111, 177 P. 214, (1918) at page 217. 
Petitioner places great reliance upon the case of Salt 
Lake Lodge No. 85, B. P. O. E. v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah 
1, 120 P. 192 (1911), as controlling its claim for exemp-
tion, urging further that the Groesbeck case creates an 
exception to the general rule of strict construction. How-
ever, as was most succinctly stated by Justice Thurman 
7 years after Groesbeck: 
"Much has been said in argument upon the 
question as to whether or not a strict or liberal 
construction should be adopted in seeking to as-
certain the meaning of the constitutional provi-
sion involved. In our judgment, as contended 
by respondent, 'there is no room for construc-
tion.' The language is plain, unequivocal, and 
unambiguous." 
Odd Fellows' v. Naylor, supra, at page 217. In addition, 
respondent would assert that the Groesbeck case has 
been limited by the decision of this Court in the Friend-
ship Manor case, and further, if still viable, should be 
limited to the facts of that case. As was stated by the 
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Supreme Court of New Mexico in a case involving the 
exempt status of an Elks' Lodge: 
"Clearly, the sole question to be determined 
is whether the property is used for charitable 
purposes. Mountain View Home, Inc. v. State 
Tax Commission, N. M. 649, 427 P. 2d 13 (1967). 
This determination must necessarily depend on 
the uses being made of each property which is 
claimed comes within the exemption. Except to 
the extent that the facts as to use are so nearly 
alike as to logically compel like results, no case 
can be said to constitute a cotnrolling precedent 
for a case in this area." (Emphasis ours.) 
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks' Lodge No. 461 
v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Department, 83 N. M. 
447, 493 P. 2d 411 (1972) at page 412. That Court also 
considered the question of how exemption provisions 
should be construed and indicated that they should be 
construed " . . . to the end that the probable intent of 
the provision is effectuated and the public interests to be 
subserved thereby are furthered." 493 P. 2d 411 at page 
413. This Court should do no less. Respondent would 
submit that the framers of our constitution recognized 
the dangers inherent in a diminishing tax base. Diminu-
tion shifts a correspondingly increased burden upon those 
already paying their share of the costs of government. 
They should not be made to pay an indirect subsidy to 
and for the benefit of those fraternal organizations that 
maintain private facilities primarily for their exclusive 
fraternal and social benefit. A similar approach was 
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taken by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of 
Indianapolis Elks Building Corporation v. State Board 
of Tax Commissioners, 145 Ind. 522, 251 N. E. 2d 672 
(1969), wherein the Court determined that the dominant 
use of the Elks' Lodge property was social and, there-
fore, not entitled to an exemption under a statute ex-
empting property used exclusively for charitable pur-
poses. In that case the Court pointed out that many 
of the objectives of the Elks' Lodge were also visible in 
the family home and other establishments that were not 
exempt from property tax. An extensive annotation re-
garding tax exemption of property used by fraternal as-
sociations is found in 39 A. L. R. 3d 624. 
Finally, respondent would urge this Court to recog-
nize the distinction between those persons actually per-
forming acts of charity and those who promote charity. 
During the year herein in question, petitioner received 
approximately $39,000.00 in cash solely for charitable 
purposes. As indicated from the record, approximately 
$29,000 was expended for charitable purposes. Who then 
performed the act of charity, the hundreds of people who 
were solicited to purchase circus tickets, car raffle tickets 
or made donations or the organization that gathered and 
expended the funds? Respondent would assert that the 
charity in this case was made possible not by the peti-
tioner but by the numerous persons who supported the 
programs sponsored by petitioner. They are the ones 
who are charitable, not the petitioner. 
Under the facts in the present case, the conclusion 
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is inescapable that the property known as Elks' Lodge 
No. 85 was not used exclusively for charitable purposes 
as that term is defined in the Constitution of Utah and 
the decision of the Tax Commission should, therefore, 
be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE PARTIAL OR PERCENTAGE EXEMP-
TION URGED BY PETITIONER IS CON-
TRARY TO THE INTENT OF THE DRAFT-
ERS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE 1973 LEG-
ISLATURE, AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE FACTS AS DETERMINED BY THE 
TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
Petitioner, in its brief, has claimed alternative relief 
by asserting a claim for partial exemption of its property 
for the third floor "Goodwill Room". 
This Court has recognized a partial exemption in 
two previous cases. Those cases do contain significant 
factual differences that make them readily distinguish-
able from the instant case. 
In Parker v. Quinn, 23 U. 332, 64 P. 961 (1901), the 
structure involved was a two-story building. The upper 
floor was used for meetings and the performance of the 
charitable work of the Relief Society. The main floor 
was rented to a third party and taxed. In general, ap-
proximately 50% of the building was used for what this 
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Court determined to be charitable purposes and a 50% 
exemption was allowed. 
In Odd Fellows' Building Ass'n v. Nay lor, 53 Utah 
111, 177 P. 214 (1918), the building in question contained 
three floors. The rooms on the first floor to a depth of 
30 feet were rented to private concerns. The rear part 
of the first floor was ranted to various tenants and was 
also used in connection with the lodge halls on the second 
and third floor which were exempt. Therefore, in excess 
of 66-2/3% of the building was used for exempt purposes. 
In the instant case, we are concerned with 75% of one 
floor of a six-story building or, assuming the same ap-
proximate floor space per floor, approximately 12-1/2% 
of the total structure *is being used exclusively for char-
itable purposes. In terms of total space allocated to 
"charity", the instant case is, therefore, readily dis-
tinguishable from the Quinn case and the Odd Fellows' 
case. 
Respondent, Salt Lake County, agrees with the as-
sertion made by the Tax Commission in its brief. Partial 
or percentage exemptions create a great administrative 
burden and are almost impossible to administer. For 
example, how are the common areas such as hallways, 
parking lots, eating facilities and elevators to be allocated 
or apportioned. How do we treat multi-purpose rooms 
or facilities that may be used for charity one day and 
non-charitable activities the next day? At what per-
centage of charitable use do we say that the property 
is not used exclusively for charitable purposes, or for 
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that matter, at what percentage of charitable use do 
we say that the property is in fact used exclusively for 
charitable purposes? Do we allow a 5% use? Do we allow 
a 10% use? How should we treat individuals in their 
homes who perform charitable activities? The law does 
not require that they be organized as a charity because 
the exemption extends to the use of the property not 
the organization. See Odd Fellows' v. Naylor, supra. 
Should we then exempt the sewing room in the home 
of an individual who makes wearing apparel and perhaps 
quilts that are utilized for the needs of the indigent? 
Should we exempt the room that is used to store dis-
carded articles that are periodically donated to various 
service organizations such as Veterans Thrift, the Junior 
League Flea Market or Deseret Industries? Where do 
we draw the line? Respondent would submit that the 
language of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution 
of Utah does not allow such apportionment. That lan-
guage speaks in terms of lots with buildings thereon used 
exclusively for charitable purposes. There is no language 
in the Constitution or the implementing statute found 
in Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, that would indicate that the exemption should 
apply to a portion of a lot with a building thereon of 
which a portion is used exclusively for charitable pur-
poses. The constitutional provision is all inclusive as is 
the statute enacted thereunder. 
Finally, in the Friendship Manor case, the trial judge 
had in fact granted a partial exemption to the manor 
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based upon the FHA requirements governing the ad-
mittance of the tenants. Although this Court did not 
direct itself specifically to that question, this Court did 
reject the ruling of the trial court that a partial exemp-
tion should be allowed and went on to tax the entire 
manor. The Court should do likewise in the case at bar 
because to allow partial or proportionate exemptions 
would lead to great albuse and would enable virtually 
every organization that conducts some form of nominal 
charitable activity to claim a proportionate exemption 
for an isolated area of its facilities that could be claimed 
to be used exclusively for its charitable purposes. Cer-
tainly, the framers of the constitution must have had 
this problem in mind when they drafted Article XIII, 
Section 2, which resf>omdeot respectfully submits pre-
cludes any partial or percentage exemptions such as the 
one requested by petitioner in this case. Respondent, 
Salt Lake County, would further support the contention 
of the Tax Commission in its brief that the allowance 
of a percentage or partial exemption of one building 
would be contrary to the legislative intent as more clearly 
indicated in the newly enacted Section 59-2-30, Utah 
Cade Annotated, 1953, as amended, 1973, 
Finally, petitioner Elks' Lodge in its brief argues 
that the fact that the Elks' Lodge does not lease a 
portion of its property and that the building in the in-
stant case is exclusively occupied by the petitioner the 
exemption should be granted. However, a reading of the 
constitutional and statutory provisions relating to ex-
emptions would clearly indicate that the exemption is 
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not granted to charitable, or for that matter non-profit 
corporations, merely because they do not lease their 
premises. The requirement of the constitution is an 
affirmative one and the burden is upon the person claim-
ing the benefit of the exemption provision to establish 
that his property is being used exclusively for charitable 
purposes. The mere failure to lease one's property clearly 
does not establish that claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Salt Lake County, respectfully submits 
to this Honorable Court that the decision of the Tax 
Commission was correct in all respects, that there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the findings 
and conclusions of the Tax Commission, that the con-
clusions of the Commission are supported by the consti-
tutional and statutory provisions applicable to this case, 
and that the decision of the Tax Commission is in har-
mony with previous rulings of this Court and that the 
order and decision of the Tax Commission should, there-
fore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS PETERS 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Respondents, 
Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization and Salt Lake 
County Assessor 
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